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Abstract—This paper studies physical-layer security for a
cache-enabled heterogeneous cellular network comprised of a
macro base station and multiple small base stations (SBSs). We
investigate a joint design on caching placement and file delivery
for realizing secure and energy-efficient transmissions against
randomly distributed eavesdroppers. We propose a novel hybrid
“most popular content” and “largest content diversity” caching
placement policy to distribute files of different popularities.
Depending on the availability and placement of the requested
file, we employ three cooperative transmission schemes, namely,
distributed beamforming, frequency-domain orthogonal trans-
mission, and best SBS relaying, respectively. We derive analytical
expressions for the connection outage probability and secrecy
outage probability for each transmission scheme. Afterwards,
we design the optimal transmission rates and caching allocation
successively to achieve a maximal overall secrecy throughput and
secrecy energy efficiency, respectively. Numerical results verify
the theoretical analyses and demonstrate the superiority of the
proposed hybrid caching policy.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, wireless caching, het-
erogeneous cellular network, cooperative transmission, secrecy
outage probability, energy efficiency, stochastic geometry.
I. INTRODUCTION
HUMAN society is striding into the era of Internet-of-Everything (IoE), and the amount of wireless data traffic
is expected to soar roughly 1000× in the coming decade.
This poses an unprecedented challenge to backhaul links
and backhaul capacity becomes a crucial system bottleneck.
Against this background, wireless caching techniques, via
which popular content can be pre-stored at the edge of
a wireless network before being requested by users, have
emerged as a promising approach for relieving the backhaul
bottleneck. Recently, wireless caching has been substantially
proven to be highly effective in aspects of alleviating the
enormous backhaul demand [1], [2], reducing the file service
latency [3]-[5], increasing the successful delivery probability
[6], and improving the energy efficiency [7], [8], etc.
Information security is a fundamental concern for a cache-
enabled wireless network. Unlike early caching techniques
applied for wired networks such as the Internet, wireless
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caching suffers a serious security vulnerability because of the
openness of physical media. Using traditional cryptographic
encryption solely to protect content secrecy against malicious
eavesdroppers will encounter three major difficulties. First and
foremost, with the rapid development of quantum computing
and data analytics, the computing-complexity based cryptog-
raphy is under severe threat since a confidential message could
easily be decrypted by brute force when eavesdropper has
an extremely high level of computing power. In the second
place, the encrypted content is tailored uniquely for each user
request and cannot be reused for other user requests [9]. Last
but not the least, the storage, management, and distribution
of secret keys are troublesome to implement in emerging
wireless networks due to the increasingly dynamic and large-
scale network topologies [10]. All these shortcomings might
outweigh the advantages of wireless caching such as high
flexibility, multiplexing gains, and resource utilization effi-
ciency. Fortunately, physical-layer security [11], which aims
to achieve information-theoretic secrecy by means of channel
coding and exploiting inherent characteristics of wireless me-
dia, e.g., random noise and fluctuate channels, is expected to be
a powerful supplement of the encryption security mechanisms.
A considerable body of literature has proven that physical-
layer security can gain remarkable secrecy enhancement for
various wireless networks [12]-[26]. In view of this, it is
meaningful to explore the potential of physical-layer security
for cache-enabled wireless networks.
A. Previous Works
Existing research involving the security issue for wireless
caching networks has mainly concentrated on encryption and
coding based on an information-theoretic framework built in
[27]. For example, the authors in [28] have proposed a coded
caching scheme as per Shannon’s one-time pad encryption to
achieve secrecy. However, such a coded scheme requires a
large quantity of random secret keys, and secure sharing of
these keys will create substantial overhead. This work has
later been extended to a device-to-device network in [29],
where a sophisticated key generation and encryption scheme
has been designed. The authors in [30] have investigated
the security-wise content placement based on the maximum
distance separable codes. In [31], secure caching placement
has been devised to prevent eavesdropper from intercepting a
sufficient number of coded packets for successfully recovering
video files. In [32], [33], the fundamental limits on the
2secure rate for both symmetric and asymmetric multilevel
diversity decoding systems have been explored with different-
importance messages stored distributively in several sources.
It should be stressed that, the predominant security menace
to a wireless caching network stems from content delivery
rather than content placement, since the former is more
susceptible to eavesdropping attacks. In response to this risk,
it is urgent to seek effective wireless security mechanisms,
particularly taking into account the intrinsic characteristics
of wireless channels. This unfortunately has not yet been
reported in the aforementioned endeavors. In two recent works
[34], [35], physical-layer security in a multi-cell wireless
caching network has been investigated. The authors have
exploited cooperative multi-antenna transmissions to increase
the secrecy rate against a single eavesdropper in [34] and
multiple untrusted cache helpers in [35]. Nevertheless, an
overly optimistic assumption has been made therein that the
instantaneous channel state information (CSI) of the eaves-
dropper can be estimated, which is difficult to realize in a
real-world wiretap scenario because the eavesdropper usually
listens passively and even remains silent to hide its existence.
Moreover, the impacts of channel fading and the uncertainty
of eavesdroppers’ locations on security performance have not
been assessed in [34], [35]. To the best of our knowledge,
the benefit of physical-layer security for a cache-enabled
wireless network has not yet been excavated in the presence
of randomly distributed eavesdroppers. In particular, a com-
prehensive performance analysis and optimization framework
on physical-layer security from a secrecy outage perspective
is still lacking. These motivate our research work.
B. Our Work and Contributions
This paper examines physical-layer security for a cache-
enabled macro/small-base-station (MBS/SBS) cellular network
coexisting with randomly located eavesdroppers. We establish
a design framework combining both caching placement and
wireless transmission, and provide a comprehensive analysis
and optimization on security performance in terms of through-
put and energy efficiency. The main contributions of this paper
are summarized as follows:
• We put forward a novel hybrid “most popular content
(MPC)” and “largest content diversity (LCD)” caching
placement policy to assign different-popularity files to
the SBSs. We then employ distributed beamforming,
frequency-domain orthogonal transmission, and best SBS
relaying as transmission schemes for the situations when
the requested file is stored at the MPC or LCD caching
mode, or is not cached by the SBSs, respectively.
• We assess the connection outage probability (COP) and
secrecy outage probability (SOP) of the content delivery
for each transmission scheme with tractable expressions
provided. We also make an analytical comparison be-
tween these schemes and summarize their pros and cons
in terms of the COP and SOP, respectively.
• We reveal a nontrivial trade-off between content diversity,
throughput, and energy efficiency under the proposed
hybrid caching policy. Subsequently, we optimize the
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Fig. 1: Illustration of a cache-enabled heterogeneous cellular network. The
delivery of confidential content to a subscriber is potentially wiretapped by
randomly located eavesdroppers. The wireless backhaul links from the MBS
to the SBSs are insecure.
overall secrecy throughput and secrecy energy efficiency
by jointly determining the transmission rates and caching
allocation. We derive explicit solutions on the optimal
rate and caching parameters, and develop various useful
properties regarding them to guide practical designs.
C. Organization and Notations
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the system model. In Sections III,
we analyze the COP and SOP for the DBF, FOT, and BSR
schemes, respectively. In Sections IV and V, we jointly de-
sign the optimal transmission rates and the optimal caching
allocation for maximizing the overall secrecy throughput and
the secrecy energy efficiency, respectively. In Section VI, we
conclude our work.
Notations: |·|, ⌈·⌉, (·)†, ln(·), P{·}, Ev[·] denote the absolute
value, round up, conjugate, natural logarithm, probability, and
the expectation taken over a random variable v, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We examine a heterogeneous cellular network where an
MBS and K SBSs collaboratively convey secret content to
a subscriber, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The ongoing content
delivery is overheard by potential eavesdroppers, e.g., non-
paying subscribers. All the SBSs are connected to the MBS
through wireless backhaul links. The SBSs each are equipped
with a cache unit, with which they can pre-store popular
content before serving local users, as a means of shifting the
traffic burden from peak to off-peak hours. If a file requested
by a subscriber is available in the SBSs, a cache hit event
3is deemed to happen, and the SBSs can directly send the
requested file to the subscriber; otherwise, a cache miss event
is said to have occurred, and the SBSs should first fetch
the requested file from the MBS and then deliver it to the
subscriber.1 The MBS, SBSs, subscribers, and eavesdroppers
are all single-antenna devices, and only one file demand is
admitted in each time slot.2 Without loss of generality, we
place a typical user (subscriber) at the origin of the polar
coordinate. We denote the locations of the MBS, the k-th near-
est SBS, and the j-th nearest eavesdropper as {b : (rb, θb)},
{sk : (rsk , θsk)}, and {ej : (rej , θej )}, respectively, with r
and θ being the corresponding distance and direction. Since
the eavesdroppers are randomly located over the network, we
model their positions by a stationary Poisson point process
(PPP) Φe on the two-dimensional plane with density λe, i.e.,
ej ∈ Φe [18]-[20]. With a PPP model, the uncertainty of
the eavesdroppers’ locations can be characterized analytically
using tools from the stochastic geometry theory, and key
insights can be abstracted conveniently.
Wireless channels, including the main channels spanning
from the SBSs to the subscriber and the wiretap channels
from the MBS/SBSs to the eavesdroppers, are modeled by a
frequency flat Rayleigh fading along with a standard distance-
based path loss. Hence, the channel gain from a transmitter
located at x to a receiver at y can be expressed as hx,yr
−α/2
x,y ,
where hx,y denotes the fading coefficient obeying the cir-
cularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with unit
mean and zero variance, rx,y denotes the distance between
x and y, and α denotes the path-loss exponent. We suppose
that the SBSs can acquire the instantaneous CSI of their
respective main channels through channel training, estimation,
and feedback. We also adopt a generic hypothesis that the
statistic CSI of the wiretap channels is also available at the
base stations [16]-[22].3
A. Hybrid Caching Placement Policy
The MBS possesses a library of N equal-size files of
different popularities. For convenience, we denote the m-th
most popular file as Fm. Assume that users make file demands
independently as per the Zipf distribution [3], and then the
request probability for file Fm is given by
pm =
m−τ∑N
n=1 n
−τ
, (1)
where τ > 0 models the skewness of popularity distribution
with a larger τ corresponding to a more concentrated popu-
larity profile.
1We assume that there is no direct transmission link from the MBS to the
user due to a deep fading and a long distance.
2If multiple subscribers send file requests to an SBS simultaneously, in
order to avoid the inter-user interference, these subscribers can be served
using orthogonal multiple access methods, e.g., TDMA and FDMA.
3Typical examples include a regular user in the network, who has no
authorization to access the content sent to the subscriber in a specific time
slot and is thus treated as a potential eavesdropper. Although it is difficult
for a base station to obtain the eavesdropper’s instantaneous CSI, the base
station is still capable to learn the eavesdropper’ statistic CSI by collecting and
analyzing an exceedingly large amount of information exchanging between
the two parties during the other time slots.
We consider that the K SBSs each have a caching capacity
of L files such that they can store up to KL files. To fully
utilize the limited cache resources, we propose a hybrid MPC
and LCD caching placement policy to judiciously distribute
files to the SBSs. To be specific, we first divide every file
into K equal-size partitions, and assign the first M ≤ L most
popular files in every SBS (i.e., MPC caching). We then use the
remaining cache resources to disjointly store the K partitions
of the less popular files at the K SBSs (i.e., LCD caching), as
a means to increase the content diversity (i.e., caching more
files). With such hybrid caching, at most M + K(L − M)
different files can be found in the cache units, and the files in
the library can be classified into three categories: file Fn with
popularity order 1 ≤ n ≤M is cached at the MPC mode and is
available in every SBS; file Fn withM < n ≤M+K(L−M)
is cached at the LCD mode, and the K SBSs each hold one
unique partition of Fn; file Fn with n > M+K(L−M) is not
stored by the SBSs and can only be fetched from the MBS. We
will later show an inherent trade-off between content diversity,
reliability, and secrecy with our hybrid caching policy. An
elaborative allocation between MPC and LCD caching, i.e.,
choosing a proper M , plays a critical role in balancing the
above aspects and enhancing the overall security performance.
B. Cooperative Transmission Schemes
When the K SBSs receive a file request from the typical
user, they should immediately deliver the requested file to it.
Depending on the storage status of the requested file, the fol-
lowing three cooperative transmission schemes are employed
for file delivery.
1) Distributed Beamforming (DBF): If the requested file
Fn is cached at the MPC mode, i.e., 1 ≤ n ≤ M , the SBSs
own the same copy of Fn. In order to improve transmission
reliability, the SBSs jointly deliver the requested file via a dis-
tributed beamforming manner.4 Denote the weight coefficient
at the k-th SBS as wsk,o = h
†
sk,o/|hsk,o|, and then the received
signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at the typical user and at the j-th
eavesdropper can be respectively expressed as
γo = Ps
∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
|hsk,o|r
−α/2
sk,o
∣∣∣∣∣
2
, (2)
γej = Ps
∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
h†sk,ohsk,ej
|hsk,o|
r−α/2sk,ej
∣∣∣∣∣
2
, ∀ej ∈ Φe, (3)
where Ps denotes the SBS transmit power normalized by
the receiver noise power. We consider identical noise spectral
density at all the receivers.
2) Frequency-Domain Orthogonal Transmission (FOT):
If the requested file Fn is cached at the LCD mode, i.e.,
M < n ≤M +K(L−M), the SBSs each have one different
partition of Fn. In order to avoid the co-channel interference,
the SBSs simultaneously transmit their stored partitions in
a frequency-domain orthogonal manner, i.e., disjointly using
1/K of the overall bandwidth. For the partition delivered from
4With DBF, each SBS only requires the local CSI of itself instead of the
global CSI, which greatly lowers the system overhead.
4the k-th SBS, the received SNRs at the typical user and at the
j-th eavesdropper can be respectively given by
γsk,o = KPs |hsk,o|
2
r−αsk,o, (4)
γsk,ej = KPs
∣∣hsk,ej ∣∣2 r−αsk,ej , ∀ej ∈ Φe. (5)
Note that the factor K exists due to the 1/K decrement of
bandwidth available for each SBS.
3) Best SBS Relaying (BSR): If the requested file Fn is
not cached by the SBSs, i.e., n > M + K(L − M), it
should be fetched from the MBS before being sent to the
user. In order to balance throughput and energy efficiency, a
BSR scheme is proposed where the SBS having the highest
main channel gain is chosen to forward the requested file
from the MBS to the typical user. Then, the whole content
delivery is divided into two hops, and there actually exists
double information leakage to the eavesdroppers due to the
insecure wireless backhauling. To prevent the eavesdroppers
from realizing coherent superposition of the two-hop sig-
nals, e.g., via maximal ratio combining, the selected SBS
employs the decode-and-forward relaying protocol and re-
encodes the message with independent codewords or even
separate codebooks from those used by the MBS [36]. By
this means, any eavesdropper can only demodulate the two-
hop signals individually, and thus the wiretapping capability
will be degraded remarkably. Denote the index of the best SBS
as k∗, i.e., k∗ = arg1≤k≤K max |hsk,o|
2r−αsk,o, and then the
received SNRs at the typical user and at the j-th eavesdropper
for the two hops can be respectively given by
γsk∗ ,o = Ps |hsk∗ ,o|
2
r−αsk∗ ,o, (6)
γb,ej = Pm
∣∣hb,ej ∣∣2 r−αb,ej , ∀ej ∈ Φe, (7)
γsk∗ ,ej = Ps
∣∣hsk∗ ,ej ∣∣2 r−αsk∗ ,ej , ∀ej ∈ Φe, (8)
where Pm denotes the MBS transmit power normalized by the
receiver noise power. Note that wireless backhauling not only
worsens transmission secrecy, but also increases the end-to-
end latency as well as power consumption. All these negative
impacts on the system performance will be taken into account
in the subsequent analysis and optimization.
In practice, the proposed caching policy and physical-
layer transmission schemes can be implemented in two dif-
ferent timescales, namely, short-timescale and long-timescale,
respectively. To be specific, in the short-timescale, content
should be delivered on-line in each time slot based on the
actual user request and the instantaneous CSI. In contrast, in
the long-timescale, the cached content can be updated off-line
every T time slots based on the historical profiles of user
preferences and the statistic CSI. Typically, we can choose
T ≫ 1, since user preferences vary on a much slower scale
(e.g., in days) than user requests (e.g., in milliseconds) [35].
C. Performance Metrics
For the sake of secrecy, the well-known Wyner’s wiretap
code is employed to encode data before transmission [11].
There are two rates in the wiretap code, namely, codeword rate
Rt and secrecy rate Rs, which are the rates of the transmitted
codewords and the embedded secret messages, respectively.
The rate redundancy Re = Rt − Rs reflects the cost of
achieving secrecy against eavesdropping. If the main channel
capacity falls below Rt, the intended receiver cannot recover
the codeword correctly and this is regarded as connection out-
age. The probability that this event takes place is referred to as
the COP, denoted as Oco. If the capacity of the wiretap channel
lies above Re, perfect secrecy is compromised and a secrecy
outage event is considered to have occurred. The probability
of this event happening is referred to as the SOP, denoted as
Oso [16]-[20]. We consider non-colluding wiretapping where
the eavesdroppers decode messages individually. Therefore,
perfect secrecy can be ensured if confidential information is
not leaked to the most deteriorate eavesdropper who has the
highest wiretap channel capacity.
In this paper, we focus on two core metrics, namely, secrecy
throughput and secrecy energy efficiency, respectively. The two
metrics measure the physical-layer security performance in
terms of transmission capacity and energy efficiency from an
outage point of view, respectively.
1) Secrecy throughput (bits/s/Hz) [16]-[20], denoted as Ψ,
is defined as the average successfully transmitted secret infor-
mation bits per second per Hertz subject to an SOP constraint
Oso ≤ ǫ, where ǫ ∈ [0, 1] is a prescribed threshold SOP. The
secrecy throughput for a specific transmission scheme, labeled
as i ∈ {D,F,B},5 can be expressed mathematically as the
product of the secrecy rate and the complement of the COP,
i.e., Ψi = Ris(1−O
i
co). Then, the overall secrecy throughput
under the proposed caching policy can be given by
Ψ¯ =
∑
i∈{D,F,B}
pitΨ
i, (9)
where pit denotes the probability of adopting scheme i, which
will be detailed later for the design of caching allocation.
2) Secrecy energy efficiency (bits/Joule/Hz) [20], denoted as
Ω, is defined as the average successfully transmitted classified
information bits per Joule per Hertz subject to an SOP
constraint. Formally, it can be expressed as the ratio of the
overall secrecy throughput Ψ¯ to the average consumed power
Pavg for serving a user request, which is given below:
Ω =
Ψ¯
Pavg
=
pDt Ψ
D + pFt Ψ
F + pBt Ψ
B
KPs(pDt + p
F
t ) + p
B
t (Pm + Ps)
. (10)
We emphasize that the wiretap codeword rate Rt, secrecy
rate Rs, rate redundancy Re, and the allocation M between
MPC and LCD caching play significant roles in improving
the secrecy throughput and secrecy energy efficiency. Specif-
ically, Rt, Rs, and Re trigger a nontrivial trade-off between
transmission reliability, secrecy, and throughput for each trans-
mission scheme. Generally, high throughput requires a large
Rs, whereas an overly large Rs will inevitably increase the
COP and in turn lower the throughput. Likewise, increasingRe
can decrease the SOP but it will also enlarge Rt thus leading
to a larger COP and a lower throughput. Meanwhile, the
allocationM strikes a vital trade-off between content diversity,
5Throughout this paper, the letters “D”, “F”, and “B” refer to the DBF,
FOT, and BSR transmission schemes, respectively.
5throughput, and energy efficiency. On the one hand, increasing
M , i.e., a larger probability of adopting the DBF scheme, is
profitable for throughput improvement. On the other hand, a
too large M will decrease the content diversity or increase the
chance of backhauling file fetching thus introducing additional
delivery delay and power consumption, which is unfortunately
destructive for throughput and energy efficiency. The above
opposite impacts on the system performance need to be
weighed carefully.
In this paper, we desire to optimize the secrecy throughput
and secrecy energy efficiency by jointly determining the values
of Rs, Re, and M . To this end, we first analyze the COP and
SOP for each transmission scheme, which will lay a solid
foundation for the subsequent optimization.
III. COP AND SOP ANALYSIS
In this section, we derive the COP Oco and the SOP Oso
for the three cooperative transmission schemes described in
Sec. II-B, namely, DBF, FOT, and BSR schemes, respectively.
For ease of notation, we will drop the superscripts {D,F,B}
when discussing the specific scheme.
A. DBF Scheme
1) COP: In the DBF scheme, all the K SBSs transmit the
same file simultaneously, and a connection outage event occurs
if log2 (1 + γo) < Rt, where γo is the SNR of the typical
user given in (2) and Rt is the wiretap codeword rate. Let
βt = 2
Rt−1 denote the threshold SNR for connection outage.
Then, the COP for the DBF scheme can be expressed as
Oco = P {γo < βt} = P


∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
|hsk,o|r
−α/2
sk,o
∣∣∣∣∣
2
<
βt
Ps

 .
(11)
Since the term
∣∣∣∑Kk=1 |hsk,o|r−α/2sk,o ∣∣∣2 in (11) is the squared
sum of independent and non-identically distributed Rayleigh
random variables, it is intractable to derive a closed-form
expression for the exact Oco. Instead, we provide an integral
representation for Oco in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The COP for the DBF scheme is given by
Oco =
(
2βt
Ps
)K ∫
y1≥0,··· ,yK≥0∑K
k=1 yk<1
e−
βt
Ps
∑K
k=1 r
α
sk,o
y2k×
K∏
k=1
(
rαsk,oyk
)
dy1, · · · , dyK . (12)
Proof 1: Please refer to Appendix A.
To facilitate the analysis, we give a closed-form expression
for Oco for the high SNR regime.
Corollary 1: At the high SNR regime where Ps →∞, the
COP Oco in (12) approaches
Oco =
2K
Γ(2K + 1)
(
βt
Ps
)K K∏
k=1
rαsk,o. (13)
Proof 2: The result follows easily by invoking
limPs→∞ e
−(βt/Ps)
∑K
k=1 r
α
sk,o
y2k → 1 and [39, Eqn. (4.634)]
with (12).
Corollary 1 shows that the COP decreases with the SBS
power Ps exponentially and increases with the codeword rate
Rt, the SBS-user distance rsk,o, and the path-loss exponent α.
The asymptoticOco in (13) further reveals that, due to the joint
transmission, the DBF scheme can achieve full diversity, i.e.,
a K-order diversity gain, where the diversity gain is defined
as the rate of decay to zero of the COP for the high SNR
regime, i.e., − limPs→∞ lnOco/lnPs [37].
2) SOP: A secrecy outage event happens if log2(1 +
maxej∈Φe γej ) > Re, where γej is the SNR of the j-th
eavesdropper given in (3) and Re is the rate redundancy. Let
βe = 2
Re − 1 denote the threshold SNR for secrecy outage.
Then, the SOP can be calculated as follows:
Oso = P
{
max
ej∈Φe
γej > βe
}
= 1− EΦe

 ∏
ej∈Φe
P

Ps
∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
h†sk,ohsk,ej
|hsk,o|
r−α/2sk,ej
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ βe




(a)
= 1− EΦe

 ∏
ej∈Φe
(
1− e
− βe/Ps∑K
k=1
r
−α
sk,ej
)
(b)
= 1− exp
(
−λe
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2π
0
e
− βe/Ps∑K
k=1
r
−α
sk,e rdrdθ
)
, (14)
where step (a) holds as the term
∣∣∣∣∑Kk=1 h†sk,ohsk,ej|hsk,o| r−α/2sk,ej
∣∣∣∣
2
obeys the exponential distribution with mean
∑K
k=1 r
−α
sk,ej , and
step (b) follows from the probability generating functional
(PGFL) over a PPP which implements EΦ
[∏
x∈Φ f(x)
]
=
exp(−λ
∫
R2
[1 − f(x)]dx) for a PPP Φ of density λ and a
real valued function f(x) : R2 → [0, 1] [38, Sec. 4.3.6]. Note
that, we have rsk,e =
√
r2sk + r
2 − 2rskr cos(θsk − θ) in step
(b). Although Oso in (14) is not closed-form, the integral is
fairly computational-convenient. We can easily confirm that
Oso increases with the eavesdropper density λe and the SBS
power Ps, and decreases with the rate redundancy Re.
B. FOT Scheme
1) COP: In the FOT scheme, the requested file is divided
into K disjoint partitions, and connection outage takes place if
not all the partitions are decoded correctly by the typical user.
In other words, the COP can be interpreted as the probability
that at least one k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} satisfies log2 (1 + γsk,o) <
Rt, where γsk,o is the SNR of the k-th main channel given
in (4). Hence, a closed-form expression for the COP can be
provided as below:
Oco = 1− P
{
K⋂
k=1
γsk,o ≥ βt
}
= 1−
K∏
k=1
P
{
|hsk,o|
2
rαsk,o
≥
βt
KPs
}
= 1− e−
βt
KPs
∑K
k=1 r
α
sk,o .
(15)
6At the high SNR regime with Ps → ∞, Oco approaches
βt
KPs
∑K
k=1 r
α
sk,o, which indicates that the FOT scheme can
only achieve a 1-order diversity gain. The following proposi-
tion states that, due to the diversity loss, the FOT scheme is
inferior to the DBF scheme in terms of reliability.
Proposition 1: The FOT scheme produces a larger COP than
that of the DBF scheme.
Proof 3: The second equality in (15) yields
Oco > 1 − P
{
min
k=1,··· ,K
K |hsk,o|
2r−αsk ,o ≥ βt/Ps
}
>
1 − P
{∣∣∣∑Kk=1 |hsk,o|r−α/2sk,o ∣∣∣2 ≥ βt/Ps
}
, with the last term
equal to the COP given in (11).
2) SOP: Perfect secrecy is violated if an arbitrary partition
of the requested file is intercepted by the eavesdroppers. Then,
the SOP can be defined as the complement of the probability
that log2
(
1 + γsk,ej
)
≤ Re holds for all k ∈ {1, · · · ,K},
where γsk,ej is the SNR of the wiretap channel from the k-th
SBS to the j-th eavesdropper given in (5). Hence, we have
Oso = 1− EΦe

 ∏
ej∈Φe
P
{
K⋂
k=1
γsk,ej ≤ βe
}

= 1− EΦe

 ∏
ej∈Φe
K∏
k=1
P
{∣∣hsk,ej ∣∣2
rαsk,ej
≤
βe
KPs
}

= 1− EΦe

 ∏
ej∈Φe
K∏
k=1
(
1− e−
βer
α
sk,ej
KPs
)
= 1− exp
(
−λe
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2π
0
[
1−
K∏
k=1
(
1− e−
βer
α
sk,e
KPs
)]
rdrdθ
)
.
(16)
Proposition 2: The FOT scheme provides a larger SOP than
that of the DBF scheme.
Proof 4: Let ωd = e
−βe/(Ps
∑K
k=1 r
−α
sk,e
) in (14) and
ωo = 1 −
∏K
k=1
(
1− e−βe/(PsKr
−α
sk,e
)
)
in (16). Now
that the SOPs for the DBF and FOT schemes share
similar forms, the proof can be completed by prov-
ing that ωo > 1 − min
k=1,··· ,K
(
1− e−βe/(PsKr
−α
sk,e
)
)
=
e
−βe/
(
KPs max
k=1,··· ,K
r−αsk,e
)
> ωd.
Proposition 2 illustrates that although the DBF scheme
superposes K identical signals at the eavesdropper, it still can
provide a higher level of secrecy than that of the FOT scheme.
This is mainly because that the FOT scheme triggers K times
information leakage to the eavesdropper.
C. BSR Scheme
1) COP: In the BSR scheme, the SBS having the highest
main channel capacity is selected to serve the typical user,
and connection outage occurs if log2(1+γsk∗ ,o) < Rt, where
γsk∗ ,o is the maximal SNR of the K main channels given in
(6) with index k∗ = arg1≤k≤K max |hsk,o|
2r−αsk,o. A closed-
form expression for the COP can be given below:
Oco = P
{
max
1≤k≤K
|hsk,o|
2
rαsk,o
<
βt
Ps
}
=
K∏
k=1
P
{
|hsk,o|
2
rαsk,o
<
βt
Ps
}
=
K∏
k=1
(
1− e−
βtr
α
sk,o
Ps
)
. (17)
Proposition 3: The BSR scheme can achieve a K-order
diversity gain.
Proof 5: Substituting the approximation limPs→∞ 1 −
e−βtr
α
sk,o
/Ps ≈ βtr
α
sk,o/Ps into (17) yields Oco =
(βt/Ps)
K∏K
k=1 r
α
sk,o
, which reveals a K-order diversity.
Proposition 4: The BSR scheme gives a COP larger than
that of the DBF scheme but less than that of the FOT scheme.
Proof 6: Clearly,
∣∣∣∑Kk=1 |hsk,o|r−α/2sk ,o ∣∣∣2 in (11) is larger
than |hsk,o|
2r−αsk,o in (17), which infers that the BSR scheme
provides a larger COP than the DBF scheme does. Like-
wise, Oco in (17) is less than min
k=1,··· ,K
(
1− e−βtr
α
sk,o
/Ps
)
=
1− e
−βt min
k=1,··· ,K
rαsk,o
/Ps
, which further lies below (15). This
indicates that the BSR scheme yields a smaller COP than that
of the FOT scheme.
Proposition 4 declares that although both the DBF and
BSR schemes can achieve full diversity, the former can still
provide a higher level of reliability since it attains an additional
performance gain from the coherent superposition of the
received signals.
2) SOP: Content delivery is divided into two hops, and
then the content is considered secure only if both the two
hops are secured. Since an eavesdropper decodes the two-
hop signals individually, the overall SOP can be characterized
as a combination of the individual SOPs for the two hops.
Recall the received SNRs at the j-th eavesdropper for the two
hops, i.e., γb,ej in (7) and γsk∗ ,ej in (8), and the SOP can be
displayed as
Oso = 1− EΦe

 ∏
ej∈Φe
(
1−O(1)so,ej
)(
1−O(2)so,ej
) , (18)
where O
(1)
so,ej , P
{
γb,ej > βe
}
= e
−βer
α
b,ej
/Pm
and O
(2)
so,ej ,
P
{
γsk∗ ,ej > βe
}
= e
−βer
α
sk∗ ,ej
/Ps
are the SOPs for the two
hops. Invoking the PGFL over a PPP with (18) yields
Oso = 1− exp
(
−λe
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2π
0
[
1−
(
1− e−βer
α
b,e/Pm
)
×
(
1− e
−βer
α
s∗
k
,e/Ps
)]
rdrdθ
)
. (19)
In the following proposition, we uncover that whether the
BSR scheme can outperform the DBF and FOT schemes or
not depends heavily on the secrecy level of the first hop.
Proposition 5: The BSR scheme can provide a higher
secrecy level compared with the DBF and FOT schemes if a
sufficiently low O
(1)
so,ej is ensured in the first hop; in contrast,
it will achieve the poorest secrecy performance if O
(1)
so,ej is
exceedingly large.
7Proof 7: For the case O
(1)
so,ej = e
−βer
α
b,ej
/Pm → 0, the
SOPs in (14), (16), and (19) share similar forms. We can prove
that e
−βer
α
s∗
k
,e/Ps in (19) is less than both e−βe/(Ps
∑K
k=1 r
−α
sk,e
)
in (14) and 1 −
∏K
k=1
(
1− e−βer
α
sk,e
/(KPs)
)
in (16), which
indicates that the BSR scheme yields a smallest SOP among
the three schemes. For the case O
(1)
so,ej → 1, the SOP for the
BSR scheme approaches one, which is larger than those of the
other two schemes.
The reason behind Proposition 5 is that the backhaul process
is one major bottleneck of the secrecy performance. As will
be detailed in the next two sections, the MBS power Pm and
the backhaul probability pBt play a vital role in improving
throughput and energy efficiency.
Note that due to the random mobility of the eavesdroppers,
their locations in the two hops can be approximately regarded
as two independent PPPs Φ
(1)
e and Φ
(2)
e with the same density
λe. In this way, the SOP can be equivalently presented in a
more concise form given blow:
Oso = 1−
∏
i=1,2
E
Φ
(i)
e

 ∏
ej∈Φ
(i)
e
(
1−O(i)so,ej
)
= 1− exp
(
−πλeΓ
(
1 +
2
α
)(
P
2
α
m + P
2
α
s
)
β
− 2α
e
)
, (20)
where the last equality follows from the PGFL over a PPP
along with [39, Eqn. (3.216.1)].
In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we depict the COP Oco and the
SOP Oso versus the SBS power Ps for the three transmission
schemes. The results of Monte-Carlo simulations match well
with the theoretical values. The asymptotic Oco in (13) and
the approximated Oso in (20) have high accuracies with their
respective exact values. As expected, as Ps increases, Oco
decreases and Oso increases. Just as proved in the last three
subsections, the DBF scheme outperforms the other two while
the FOT scheme provides the poorest reliability performance.
For transmission secrecy, the DBF scheme always surpasses
the FOT scheme; whereas the BSR scheme yields the largest
SOP at the low Ps regime but achieves the smallest SOP at the
high Ps regime. The underlying reason is that, compared with
the DBF and FOT schemes where K SBSs transmit signals to
the eavesdroppers, the BSR scheme only selects a single SBS
in the second hop, which makes the wiretapping more difficult
if only the first-hop secrecy can be promised.
IV. SECRECY THROUGHPUT MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we will jointly design the optimal secrecy
rate Rs and rate redundancy Re of the wiretap code and the
allocation M of the hybrid caching policy to maximize the
overall secrecy throughput Ψ¯ given in (9). This optimization
problem can be formulated as follows:
max
Ris,R
i
e,M,∀i∈{D,F,B}
Ψ¯ =
∑
i∈{D,F,B}
pit
(
1−Oico
)
Ris, (21a)
s.t. Ris ≥ 0, R
i
e ≥ 0, (21b)
Oiso ≤ ǫ, (21c)
0 ≤M ≤ L, (21d)
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Fig. 2: COP Oco vs. Ps, with K = 3 and βt = 1. Throughout the
experiments in this paper, for simplicity, we place the typical user, the nearest
SBS, and the MBS along a vertical line, and deploy all the SBSs along a
horizontal line with an identical distance rs. Unless otherwise specified, we
always set rb,s1 = 2, rs1,o = 1, rs = 0.5, and α = 4.
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Fig. 3: SOP Oso vs. Ps, with K = 5, Pm = 0 dBw, λe = 0.1, and βe = 1.
where (21b), (21c), and (21d) are the constraints of the wiretap
code rates, the maximal tolerable SOP, and the caching capac-
ity, respectively, and pit, O
i
co, and O
i
so denote the probability
of adopting the transmission scheme i ∈ {D,F,B} and the
corresponding COP and SOP, respectively.
Observing that only pit in Ψ¯ depends on M , the primary
problem (21a) can be decomposed into two steps: 1) first
maximizing Ψi =
(
1−Oico
)
Ris subject to O
i
so ≤ ǫ over R
i
s
and Rie for scheme i ∈ {D,F,B}; 2) then maximizing Ψ¯ over
M . In what follows, we execute the optimization procedure
step by step. To begin with, we formulate the first-step problem
uniformly as below:
max
Rs≥0,Re≥0
Ψ = (1−Oco)Rs, s.t. Oso ≤ ǫ. (22)
Intuitively, neither a too small nor a too large Rs can lead to
a high Ψ due to the reverse behavior of Oco. Hence, Rs should
be carefully chosen to balance the rate and outage. Once Rs is
fixed, Ψ monotonically decreases with Re. This suggests that
we should set Re as small as possible in order to maximize Ψ.
Denote the minimal Re as R
◦
e = log2(1+β
◦
e ). Obviously, we
should satisfy Oso(β
◦
e ) = ǫ since Oso(βe) decreases with βe.
The value of β◦e can be quickly obtained via a bisection search,
8which is β◦e , O
−1
so (ǫ), where O
−1
so (ǫ) is the inverse function
of Oso(βe). With Rt = R
◦
e + Rs ⇒ βt = β
◦
e + (1 + β
◦
e )βs,
problem (22) can be recast into
max
βs≥0
Ψ = (1−Oco) log2(1 + βs). (23)
A. Optimal βs for the DBF Scheme
Substituting the COP Oco in (13) into (23) yields
max
βs≥0
Ψ =
[
1−A1(βs +B1)
K
]
log2(1 + βs), (24)
where A1 =
2K
Γ(2K+1)
(
1+β◦e
Ps
)K∏K
k=1 r
α
sk,o
and B1 =
β◦e
1+β◦e
.
The solution to problem (24) is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The secrecy throughput Ψ for the DBF scheme
given in (24) is a concave function of βs, and the optimal β
∗
s
that maximizes Ψ is characterized by
dΨ
dβ∗s
= 0, (25)
i.e., it is the unique zero-crossing of the derivative dΨdβs with
dΨ
dβs
=
1−A1(βs +B1)
K
(1 + βs) ln 2
−A1K(βs+B1)
K−1 log2(1+βs).
(26)
Proof 8: We can easily show that dΨdβs in (26) monotonically
decreases with βs. Hence, Ψ in (24) is concave on βs. Next,
we prove that dΨdβs is positive at βs = 0 and is negative as
βs → ∞. Therefore, there exists a unique zero-crossing of
dΨ
dβs
, which is the solution to problem (24).
Due to the concavity of Ψ on βs, the optimal β
∗
s can be
efficiently calculated using the Newton’s method with (25).
Although β∗s appears in an implicit form, some insights into
its behavior can still be developed in the following corollary.
Corollary 2: The optimal β∗s satisfying (25) increases with
the threshold SOP ǫ and decreases with the eavesdropper
density λe, the SBS-user distance rsk,o, and the path-loss
exponent α.
Proof 9: Let Z(β∗s , A1) denote
dΨ
dβs
in (26) with βs replaced
by β∗s . Then, the derivative
dβ∗s
dA1
can be calculated by using
the derivative rule for implicit functions [18] with (25),
dβ∗s
dA1
= −
∂Z/∂A1
∂Z/∂β∗s
< 0. (27)
By realizing that A1 is an increasing function of rsk,o, α, and
β◦e , and meanwhile β
◦
e decreases with ǫ and increases with λe,
the proof can be completed.
B. Optimal βs for the FOT Scheme
Plugging the COP Oco in (15) into (23), we have
max
βs≥0
Ψ = A2e
−B2βs log2(1 + βs), (28)
where A2 = e
−(β◦e/Ps)
∑K
k=1 r
α
sk,o and B2 =
1+β◦e
Ps
∑K
k=1 r
α
sk,o
.
The solution to problem (28) is presented by the following
theorem.
Theorem 3: The secrecy throughput Ψ for the FOT scheme
in (28) is quasi-concave on βs, and the optimal β
∗
s maximizing
Ψ is the unique zero-crossing of the following derivative dΨdβs ,
dΨ
dβs
= −
A2e
−B2βs
ln 2
(
B2 ln(1 + βs)−
1
1 + βs
)
. (29)
Proof 10: It can be proved that the two boundaries are
dΨ
dβs
|βs=0 = A2 > 0 and
dΨ
dβs
|βs→∞ < 0. Due to the continuity
of Ψ, there is at least one zero-crossing of dΨdβs . Denote an
arbitrary one as β∗s such that B2 ln(1 + β
∗
s ) −
1
1+β∗s
= 0.
Then, we have the second derivative d
2Ψ
dβ2s
at βs = β
∗
s ,
d2Ψ
dβ2s
|βs=β∗s = −
A2e
−B2βs
(1 + βs) ln 2
(
B2 +
1
1 + βs
)
< 0. (30)
This indicates that Ψ is a quasi-concave function of βs [40].
Hence, β∗s is the unique zero-crossing of
dΨ
dβs
, i.e., it is the
solution to problem (28).
Note that the derivative dΨdβs in (29) is initially positive and
then negative as βs increases, and hence β
∗
s can be easily
derived through a bisection search with the equation dΨdβs =
0. Furthermore, following similar steps as Corollary 2, the
same conclusions can be made on the relationship between
the optimal β∗s and the parameters ǫ, rsk,o, and α.
C. Optimal βs for the BSR Scheme
Inserting the COP Oco in (17) into (23) arrives at
max
βs≥0
Ψ =
log2(1 + βs)
2
[
1−
K∏
k=1
(
1−A3,ke
−B3,kβs
)]
,
(31)
where A3,k = e
−β◦er
α
sk,o
/Ps and B3,k =
1+β◦e
Ps
rαsk,o. Note that
the factor 12 exists due to a two-hop delivery process. Although
it is difficult to determine the concavity of Ψ with respect to
βs, one can easily verify that the derivative
dΨ
dβs
is first positive
and then negative as βs increases, which implies that there
exists a unique zero-crossing of dΨdβs . Hence, the optimal β
∗
s
maximizing Ψ can be numerically computed by setting dΨdβ∗s
to
zero. In the following proposition, we further provide a sub-
optimal β◦s that can maximize a lower bound for Ψ in (31).
Proposition 6: The value of Ψ in (31) is lower bounded
by Ψ◦ = log2(1+βs)2 A3,k◦e
−B3,k◦βs , with index k◦ =
argk=1,··· ,K min rsk,o. The optimal β
◦
s that maximizes Ψ
◦
shares the same form as β∗s shown in (29), simply with A2
and B2 therein replaced with A3,k◦ and B3,k◦ , respectively.
Proof 11: We obtain the lower bound Ψ◦ from (31) by
realizing that
∏K
k=1
(
1−A3,ke
−B3,kβs
)
< A3,k◦e
−B3,k◦βs .
Then, the proof can be completed following the proof of
Theorem 3.
In Fig. 4, we plot the secrecy throughput Ψ as a function of
the secrecy rate Rs. As proved in the above three subsections,
Ψ initially increases and then decreases with Rs, and there is
a unique Rs maximizing Ψ. We show that by exploiting the
instantaneous CSI of the main channels, the DBF scheme at-
tains a significant throughput gain over the other two schemes.
Besides, the FOT scheme is superior to the BSR scheme at
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Fig. 4: Ψ vs. Rs for different values of ǫ, with K = 2, Pm = 10 dBw,
Ps = 10 dBw, and λe = 0.01.
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Fig. 5: Ψ∗ vs. Ps for different values of λe, with K = 3, Pm = 40 dBw,
and ǫ = 0.3.
the low Rs regime whereas becomes inferior at the high Rs
regime. The cause behind is that, due to the bottleneck of
the first-hop secrecy, the BSR scheme requires a larger rate
redundancy Re than the FOT scheme does. Hence, at the low
Rs regime, the codeword rate Rt = Rs+Re and the resulting
COP for the BSR scheme become remarkably larger than
those for the FOT scheme. However, at the high Rs regime,
the superiority of the BSR scheme in terms of reliability is
demonstrated, which counterbalances the adverse impact of the
first-hop secrecy. We also observe that, Ψ improves for a larger
acceptable SOP ǫ, and the optimal Rs increases accordingly,
just as indicated in Corollary 2.
Fig. 5 depicts the maximal secrecy throughput Ψ∗ for the
proposed transmission schemes. The high accuracy of the
theoretical results to the simulations is confirmed. As expected,
throughput performance deteriorates for a larger eavesdropper
density λe. Owing to the adaption of transmission rates,
increasing the SBS power Ps can always improve secrecy
throughput. Nevertheless, as Ps grows large, the throughput
gain becomes negligible due to the SOP constraint. We also
find that the FOT scheme outperforms the BSR scheme at the
low SNR regime but becomes inferior at the high SNR regime,
which are quite similar to the observations in Fig. 4.
D. Optimal Caching Allocation Design
Having obtained the maximal secrecy throughput for each
transmission scheme, we will determine the optimal caching
allocation M to maximize the overall secrecy throughput
Ψ¯ =
∑
i∈{D,F,B} p
i
tΨ
i. This subsection focuses on a limited
caching capacity case where the total caching capacity is less
than the file number, i.e., KL < N . In other words, whatever
M we choose, the cache miss event can happen if the popu-
larity order of the requested file Fn is n > M +K(L−M).
The case KL ≥ N will be discussed in the next subsection.
Before proceeding to the optimization problem, we first
calculate the probabilities pit for i ∈ {D,F,B} as per the
caching policy described in Sec. II,
pDt =
M∑
m=1
pm, p
F
t =
M+K(L−M)∑
m=M+1
pm, p
B
t = 1−p
D
t −p
F
t , (32)
with pm being the Zipf probability given in (1). For tractability,
we approximate
∑M
m=1 pm as
M∑
m=1
pm ≈
1− (M + 1)1−τ
1− (N + 1)1−τ
, (33)
which derives from
∑M
m=1m
−τ ≈
∫M+1
1
t−τdt =
1−(M+1)1−τ
τ−1 . Invoking (33) with (32), the problem of max-
imizing Ψ¯ over M can be formulated as follow:
max
0≤M≤L
Ψ¯ =
ΨDB −ΨDF(M + 1)1−τ −ΨFB(KL −K1M)
1−τ
1− (N + 1)1−τ
,
(34)
where KL , KL + 1, K1 , K − 1, and Ψ
DF , ΨD − ΨF,
ΨFB , ΨF − ΨB, and ΨDB , ΨD − ΨB(N + 1)1−τ reflect
the throughput gaps between two transmission schemes. We
always have ΨDF > 0 since the DBF scheme offers lower
COP and SOP than those of the FOT scheme.
The solution to problem (34) is provided below, with the
proof relegated Appendix B.
Theorem 4: With hybrid MPC and LCD caching placement,
the optimal allocation of MPC cachingM∗T that maximizes the
overall secrecy throughput Ψ¯ in (34) is given by
M∗T =


L, ΨDF > K1Ψ
FB,
0, ΨDF < K1K
−τ
L Ψ
FB,⌈
L− L+1KΛ+1
⌉
, otherwise,
(35)
where Λ =
[(
K1Ψ
FB/ΨDF
) 1
τ − 1
]−1
∈
(
K−1L ,∞
)
.
Theorem 4 demonstrates that the optimal caching allocation
relies significantly on the throughput difference between dif-
ferent transmission schemes. Specifically, i) if the throughput
gain of the DBF scheme to the FOT scheme ΨDF is over K1
times larger than the throughput gain of the FOT scheme to
the BSR scheme ΨFB, we have M∗T = L, which suggests
that MPC caching is beneficial and we should cache the
same files of high popularities; ii) if the throughput gain
ΨFB is remarkably larger, i.e., exceeding KτL/K1 times than
ΨDF, we should switch to the LCD caching mode and store
different partitions of files in different SBSs; iii) for a moderate
situation where K1K
−τ
L ≤ Ψ
DF/ΨFB ≤ K1, there exists an
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optimal allocation between MPC and LCD caching, which
strikes a good balance between secrecy throughput and content
diversity. Additionally, we can prove that the optimal M∗T
increases with the file popularity skewness τ . This is because,
as the content popularity becomes more concentrated (i.e.,
a larger τ ), the benefit from caching different files becomes
limited in terms of throughput improvement.
E. Large Caching Capacity Cases
This subsection examines two large caching capacity cases
where the total caching capacity KL or even each SBS’s
storage capacity L are not less than the number of files N ,
namely, KL ≥ N > L and L ≥ N , respectively. Recall
our hybrid caching policy, and we know that if we choose
M ≤ KL−NK−1 for the former case, all the N files can be
stored in the K SBSs since M +K(L −M) ≥ N . In other
words, the cache miss event can be avoided. For the latter
case, a single SBS can store all the N files, and therefore the
cache miss event absolutely will not happen, or equivalently,
the BSR scheme never will be activated. In what follows, we
present the optimal caching allocation for the above two cases,
respectively.
Proposition 7: For the case KL ≥ N > L, the optimal
allocation M⋆T of MPC caching that maximizes Ψ¯ is given
by M⋆T = max
{
KL−N
K−1 ,M
∗
T
}
, where M∗T is provided by
Theorem 4.
Proof 12: First consider M ≤ KL−NK−1 , and we have p
D
t =∑M
m=1 pm and p
F
t = 1−p
D
t . We can prove that Ψ¯ = p
D
t Ψ
D+
pFt Ψ
F increases with M and reaches the maximum at M =
KL−N
K−1 . On the other hand, the optimal M for M >
KL−N
K−1
simply follows from Theorem 4. The proof can be completed
by combing the results for the two situations.
Proposition 8: For the case L ≥ N , MPC caching can
achieve a maximal Ψ¯.
Proof 13: The result follows easily by proving that Ψ¯
increases with M for M < N .
Propositions 7 and 8 indicate that when the caching capacity
and the number of files are comparable, the optimal caching
allocation will be impacted by the file number, which differs
from Theorem 4. More precisely, as the caching capacity
increases, it is throughput-wise favorable to store more files
via MPC caching. The fundamental cause lies in the growing
probability of the cache hit event and the superiority of the
DBF scheme itself in terms of throughput enhancement.
Fig. 6 describes the optimal allocation M∗T versus the
number of files N . The simulated optimal M∗T is obtained
by exhaustive search and matches well with the theoretical
value, validating the accuracy of the approximation given in
(33). As proved by Propositions 7 and 8, at the large caching
capacity regime, i.e., KL ≥ N , M∗T first increases linearly
and then decreases linearly with N . As N increases further,
M∗T remains constant, which coincides with Theorem 4. In
addition, as explained for Theorem 4, M∗T decreases with the
MBS power Pm whereas increases with the content popularity
skewness τ .
Fig. 7 compares the maximal overall secrecy through-
put Ψ¯∗ for three different caching policies, namely, hybrid
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Fig. 6: M∗
T
vs. Ps for different values of Pm and τ , with K = 2, Ps = 20
dBw, λe = 0.002, ǫ = 0.2, and L = 10.
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Fig. 7: Ψ¯∗ vs. N for different values of τ , with K = 3, Pm = 60 dBw,
Ps = 25 dBw, λe = 0.002, ǫ = 0.2, and L = 10.
caching, MPC, and LCD caching, respectively. We show that
hybrid caching always outperforms the other two, since it
can strike a good balance between secrecy throughput and
content diversity. We also find that Ψ¯∗ decreases with N ,
since in this circumstance the cache miss probability increases,
which weakens the benefit of caching. Additionally, as the file
popularity becomes more concentrated (i.e., a larger τ ), MPC
caching provides a larger Ψ¯∗ than that of LCD caching and the
performance is close to that of hybrid caching. This suggests
that MPC can be an alternative solution for secrecy throughput
maximization at the large τ regime.
V. SECRECY ENERGY EFFICIENCY MAXIMIZATION
This section aims to tackle the problem of maximizing
the secrecy energy efficiency Ω defined in (10), which can
be formulated similarly as (21a) simply with the objective
function Ψ¯ replaced with Ω = Ψ¯/Pavg, where Pavg is the total
consumed power. Since Pavg only depends on the allocation
of MPC caching M rather than Rs and Re, this problem can
be decomposed into two steps as described in Sec. IV where
we have already obtained the maximal secrecy throughput Ψi
for transmission scheme i ∈ {D,F,B} in the first step. Hence,
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we only need to optimize Ω overM . Substitute pit in (32) into
(10), and then this sub-problem can be formulated as follows:
max
0≤M≤L
Ω =
ΨDB−ΨDF(M+1)1−τ−ΨFB(KL−K1M)
1−τ
∆P1 +∆P2(KL−K1M)1−τ
,
(36)
where ∆P1 , KPs − (Pm + Ps)(N + 1)
1−τ , ∆P2 , Pm −
K1Ps, and KL, K1, Ψ
DB, ΨDF, and ΨFB are defined in (34).
Note that for the large caching capacity cases KL ≥ N as
discussed in Sec. IV-E, the optimal caching allocation follows
easily from Propositions 7 and 8 with quite similar reasons
behind. Hence, due to the page limitation, in this subsection
we only examine the limited caching capacity case KL≪ N .
The secrecy energy efficiency Ω in (36) is impacted by
various aspects, including the secrecy throughput for each
transmission scheme and the MBS/SBS power. All these
elements make the caching allocation sophisticated to devise.
Inspired by the fact that the MBS power Pm is typically much
larger than the SBS power Ps, we focus on a plausible situation
Pm ≥ KPs along with a highly concentrated file popularity
τ > 1. Nevertheless, the design for general cases can be
executed similarly, which might incur a tedious classified dis-
cussion and a significant computation burden. The following
theorem provides an explicit solution to problem (36).
Theorem 5:With hybrid MPC and LCD caching, the optimal
allocation of MPC caching M∗E that maximizes the secrecy
energy efficiency Ω in (36) is given by
M∗E =


L, ΨDF ≥ ∆ΨBξ(L),
0, ΨDF ≤ ∆ΨBξ(0),
⌈M◦⌉, otherwise,
(37)
where ∆ΨB , ∆P1Ψ
FB + ∆P2Ψ
DB denotes the aggregate
throughput gain of the DBF and FOT schemes over the BSR
scheme, ξ(M) is an increasing function of M given below:
ξ(M) =
K1(M + 1)
τ
∆P1(KL −K1M)τ +∆P2K(L+ 1)
> 0, (38)
and M◦ is the unique root of the equation ξ(M) = Ψ
DF
∆ΨB .
Proof 14: Please refer to Appendix C.
Theorem 5 provides quite a few interesting insights into the
optimal caching allocation:
1) M∗E = L always holds if ∆Ψ
B ≤ 0. The condition
∆ΨB ≤ 0 is equivalent to
Pm + Ps
KPs
≤
ΨDF +ΨB
[
1− (N + 1)1−τ
]
ΨDF +ΨF [1− (N + 1)1−τ ]
. (39)
This indicates that, when the ratio (Pm + Ps)/(KPs) (or
ΨB/ΨF) of the BSR scheme over the FOT scheme is lower
(or larger) than a certain threshold, it is more conductive to
employ MPC caching. This is because, compared to the FOT
scheme, in this circumstance the BSR scheme can contribute
significantly to improving the secrecy energy efficiency, since
it achieves a favorable throughput while not consuming too
much power. Hence, we are supposed to increase the proba-
bility of adopting the BSR scheme, i.e., activating the MPC
caching mode alone.
2) When the BSR can only provide a slight or even no
benefit for the secrecy energy efficiency, e.g., an overly high
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Fig. 8: M∗
E
vs. N for different values of Pm and τ , with K = 2, Ps = 10
dBw, λe = 0.01, ǫ = 0.2, and L = 10.
MBS power or low secrecy throughput, the optimal caching
allocation is dominated by the throughput gap ΨDF between
the DBF and FOT schemes. To be more precise: i) MPC
caching is more rewarding for a significant throughput gap
ΨDF ≥ ∆ΨBξ(L); ii) LCD caching becomes preferred for a
marginal throughput gap ΨDF ≤ ∆ΨBξ(0); iii) for a moderate
throughput gap, hybrid caching is necessary for guaranteeing
a high level of secrecy energy efficiency. The fundamental
reason is that, through adjusting the allocation between MPC
and LCD caching, we can strike a superior balance between
throughput and power consumption.
3) Although the optimal M◦ does not appear in an explicit
form in (37), we can prove that
dM◦/dτ = −
∂Y (M◦)/∂τ
∂Y (M◦)/∂M◦
< 0, (40)
by invoking the derivative rule for implicit functions [18]
with the equation Y (M◦) = 0, where Y (M) is defined
in Appendix C. This suggests that, we should decrease the
allocation of MPC caching as the file popularity becomes
increasingly concentrated (i.e., a larger τ ), which is as opposed
to the growth trend observed in Fig. 6.
Fig. 8 presents the optimal allocation of MPC caching M∗E
versus the number of files N . We observe that for the large
caching capacity case KL ≥ N , M∗E first increases linearly
and then decreases linearly with N , which is similar to Fig. 6.
What is different is that M∗E increases continuously with N ,
since a larger portion of cache resources should be devoted
for MPC caching to maintain a high secrecy throughput. We
also show that M∗E decreases with the MBS power Pm. The
underlying reason is that, to counter-balance the increasing
backhaul power consumption, a larger portion of cache re-
sources should be reserved for LCD caching to increase the
cache hit probability such that the negative impact of backhaul
can be mitigated. This manifests the necessity of caching for
energy-efficient wireless networks when taking into considera-
tion the backhaul power consumption and delay. Interestingly,
it is found thatM∗E increases with the file popularity skewness
τ at the small N regime whereas decreases with τ at the large
N regime. This can be explained as follow: for a small N , as
the file popularity becomes more concentrated (i.e., a larger
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Fig. 9: Ω∗ vs. Ps for different values of K and L, with Pm = 30 dBw,
λe = 0.01, ǫ = 0.3, N = 100, and τ = 1.5.
τ ), the advantage from caching more different files is limited
and MPC caching is more favorable to increase the secrecy
throughput. However, when N is sufficiently large, the benefit
from MPC caching in throughput improvement is outweighed
by the growing power consumption, whereas increasing the
allocation of LCD caching can lower the consumed power
and is thus considerably more energy efficient.
Fig. 9 compares our proposed hybrid caching policy with
two conventional approaches solely employing MPC and LCD
caching, respectively. Clearly, hybrid caching can always pro-
vide the highest secrecy energy efficiency Ω∗, since it can
balance secrecy throughput well with power consumption.
We show that Ω∗ initially increases and then decreases with
the SBS power Ps. This is because, a too small Ps leads
to a low overall secrecy throughput whereas a large Ps
results in a high consumed power; both aspects will impair
the secrecy energy efficiency. Additionally, it is as expected
that increasing either the number of SBSs K or each SBS’s
caching capacity L is beneficial for enhancing the secrecy
energy efficiency. From the last two subgraphs with equal total
caching capacity, i.e., KL = 30, it is surprise to find that
equipping a large-capacity cache unit may be more appealing
than deploying more SBSs. We can attribute this phenomenon
to two causes: a larger L is more rewarding for increasing the
cache hit probability, whereas a larger K results in a higher
power consumption. This highlights the superiority of wireless
caching in improving energy efficiency for cellular networks.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we explore the potential of physical-layer
security in cache-enabled heterogeneous cellular networks
coexisting with PPP distributed eavesdroppers. We analyze
and optimize the secrecy throughput and secrecy energy ef-
ficiency under a hybrid MPC and LCD caching policy along
with cooperative transmissions between the MBS and SBSs.
We provide various interesting insights into the behavior of
the optimal transmission rates and the allocation of hybrid
caching. We reveal that hybrid caching can always outperform
the exclusive use of either MPC or LCD caching in terms of
both secrecy throughput and energy efficiency performance.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Recall the COP Oco given in (11) and let xk =
|hsk,o|r
−α/2
sk,o , then Oco can be rewritten as
Oco = P
{
K∑
k=1
xk <
√
βt/Ps
}
. (41)
Note that xk obeys the Rayleigh distribution with the prob-
ability density function (PDF) fxk(xk) = 2r
α
sk,oxke
−rαsk,o
x2k .
Due to the independence among {xk}
K
k=1, the joint PDF can
be given by
fx1,··· ,xK (x1, · · · , xK) =
K∏
k=1
2rαsk,oxke
−rαsk,o
x2k . (42)
Substituting (42) into (41) and changing the variable xk →√
βs/Psyk arrives at (12).
B. Proof of Theorem 4
Treat M as a continuous variable, and we can compute the
derivative dΨ¯dM from (34),
dΨ¯
dM
=
(τ − 1)(M + 1)−τ
1− (N + 1)1−τ
G(M), (43)
whereG(M) = ΨDF−ΨFBK1
(
M+1
KL−K1M
)τ
. The sign of dΨ¯dM
is consistent with that of G(M) and is closely related to the
sign of ΨFB. Since ΨDF > 0, if ΨFB ≤ 0, we have G(M) >
0. Hence, Ψ¯ increases with M and reaches the maximum at
M = L. For the situation ΨFB > 0 such that G(M) decreases
with M , we distinguish the following three cases.
Case 1: If G(L) > 0, i.e., ΨDF > (K − 1)ΨFB, dΨ¯dM is
positive, which indicates that Ψ¯ is an increasing function of
M . Hence, the maximal Ψ¯ is achieved at M = L.
Case 2: If G(0) < 0, i.e., ΨDF < K−1(KL+1)τΨ
FB, dΨ¯dM is
negative, which indicates that Ψ¯ is a decreasing function of
M . Hence, the maximal Ψ¯ is achieved at M = 0.
Case 3: If G(L) ≤ 0 ≤ G(0), i.e., K−1(KL+1)τ ≤
ΨDF
ΨFB ≤
K − 1, dΨ¯dM is first positive and then negative as M increases,
i.e., Ψ¯ first increases and then decreases with M . Hence, the
maximal Ψ¯ is achieved at the zero-crossing of dΨ¯dM . Solving
the equation dΨ¯dM∗ = 0 completes the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 5
We start by calculating the derivative dΩdM from (36),
dΩ
dM
=
(τ − 1)(M + 1)−τ (KL −K1M)
−τ
[∆P1 +∆P2(KL−K1M)1−τ ]
2 Y (M), (44)
where Y (M) = I(M)ΨDF−K1(M+1)
τ∆ΨB, with I(M) =
∆P1(KL−K1M)
τ +∆P2K(L+1) > 0 and ∆Ψ
B defined in
(37). Considering N ≫ 1 and τ > 1, we have (1 +N)1−τ =
0 such that ∆P1 > 0 and I(M) decreases with M . Since
ΨDF > 0, if ∆ΨB ≤ 0, we have Y (M) > 0. Hence, Ω
increases with M and reaches the maximum at M = L. For
the case ∆ΨB > 0, Y (M) is a decreasing function of M .
Then, the proof can be completed following Appendix B.
13
REFERENCES
[1] X. Wang, M. Chen, T. Taleb, A. Ksentini, and V. Leung, “Cache in the
air: Exploiting content caching and delivery techniques for 5G systems,”
IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 131–139, Feb. 2014.
[2] L. Xiang, D. W. K. Ng, T. Islam, R. Schober, V. W. S. Wong, and J.
Wang, “Cross-layer optimization of fast video delivery in cache- and
buffer-enabled relaying networks,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 66,
no. 12, pp. 11366–11382, Jun. 2017.
[3] K. Shanmugam, N. Golrezaei, A. Dimakis, A. Molisch, and G. Caire,
“FemtoCaching: Wireless content delivery through distributed caching
helpers,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 59, no. 12, pp. 8402–8413, Dec.
2013.
[4] V. Aggarwal, Y. F. R. Chen, T. Lan, and Y. Xiang, “Sprout: A functional
caching approach to minimize service latency in erasure-coded storage,”
IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 3683–3694, Dec. 2017.
[5] E. Friedlander and V. Aggarwal, “Generalization of LRU
cache replacement policy with applications to video streaming,”
https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.10853, Jun. 2018.
[6] Z. Chen, J. Lee, and M. Kountouris, “Cooperative caching and transmis-
sion design in cluster-centric small cell networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 16, no. 5, pp. 3401–3415, Mar. 2017.
[7] A. Liu and V. Lau, “Cache-enabled opportunistic cooperative MIMO for
video streaming in wireless systems,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol.
62, no. 2, pp. 390–402, Jan. 2014.
[8] D. Liu and C. Yang, “Will caching at base station improve energy
efficiency of downlink transmission?” in Proc. IEEE GlobalSIP, Atlanta,
GA, Dec. 2014.
[9] G. Paschos, E. Bas¸tug˘, I. Land, G. Caire, and M. Debbah, “Wireless
caching: Technical misconceptions and business barriers,” IEEE Com-
mun. Mag., vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 16–22, Aug. 2016.
[10] H. V. Poor, “Information and inference in the wireless physical layer,”
IEEE Wireless Commun., vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 40–47, Feb. 2012.
[11] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, no. 8,
pp. 1355–1387, Oct. 1975.
[12] H.-M. Wang and T.-X. Zheng, Physical Layer Security in Random
Cellular Networks. Singapore: Springer, 2016.
[13] H.-M. Wang, T.-X. Zheng, J. Yuan, D. Towsley, and M. H. Lee,
“Physical layer security in heterogeneous cellular networks,” IEEE
Trans. Commun., vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 1204–1219, Mar. 2016.
[14] N. Yang, L. Wang, G. Geraci, M. Elkashlan, J. Yuan, and M. D. Renzo,
“Safeguarding 5G wireless communication networks using physical
layer security,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 20–27, Apr.
2015.
[15] Y. Zou, X. Wang, and L. Hanzo, “A survey on wireless security:
Technical challenges, recent advances and future trends,” Proc. IEEE,
vol. 104, no. 9, pp. 1727–1765, Sep. 2016.
[16] X. Zhou, R. Ganti, J. Andrews, and A. Hjørungnes, “On the throughput
cost of physical layer security in decentralized wireless networks,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 10, no. 8, pp. 2764–2775, Aug. 2011.
[17] X. Zhang, X. Zhou, and M. R. McKay, “Enhancing secrecy with multi-
antenna transmission in wireless ad hoc networks,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Forensics and Security, vol. 8, no. 11, pp. 1802–1814, Nov. 2013.
[18] T.-X. Zheng, H.-M. Wang, J. Yuan, D. Towsley, and M. H. Lee, “Multi-
antenna transmission with artificial noise against randomly distributed
eavesdroppers,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 63, no. 11, pp. 4347–4362,
Nov. 2015.
[19] T.-X. Zheng, H.-M. Wang, Q. Yang, and M. H. Lee, “Safeguarding
decentralized wireless networks using full-duplex jamming receivers,”
IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 278–292, Jan. 2017.
[20] T.-X. Zheng, H.-M. Wang, J. Yuan, Z. Han, and M. H. Lee, “Physical
layer security in wireless ad hoc networks under a hybrid full-/half-
duplex receiver deployment strategy,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.,
vol. 16, no. 6, pp. 3827–3839, Jun. 2017.
[21] Y. Deng, L. Wang, M. Elkashlan, A. Nallanathan, and R. K. Mallik,
“Physical layer security in three-tier wireless sensor networks: A
stochastic geometry approach,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics and Security,
vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 1128–1138, Jun. 2016.
[22] Y. Liu, Z. Qin, M. Elkashlan, Y. Gao, and L. Hanzo, “Enhancing the
physical layer security of non-orthogonal multiple access in large-scale
networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 1656–
1672, Mar. 2017.
[23] A. Singh, M. R. Bhatnagar, and R. K. Mallik, “Secrecy outage of a
simultaneous wireless information and power transfer cognitive radio
system,” IEEE Wireless Commun. Lett., vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 288–291, Jun.
2016.
[24] A. Garg, H. K. Boddapati, and M. R. Bhatnagar, “Secrecy performance
of imperfect one bit feedback based alamouti MISO system,” IEEE
Commun. Lett., vol. 21, no. 12, pp. 2690–2693, Dec. 2017.
[25] A. Singh, M. R. Bhatnagar, and R. K. Mallik, “Physical layer security
of a multiantenna-based CR network with single and multiple primary
users,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 66, no. 12, pp. 11011–11022,
Dec. 2017.
[26] S. Ghosh, M. R. Bhatnagar, A. Singh, and B. K. Panigrahi, “Secrecy
capacity in CRN with malicious energy harvester using game theoretic
techniques,” IEEE Trans. Cogn. Commun. Netw., vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 343–
360, Sep. 2017.
[27] M. A. Maddah-Ali and U. Niesen, “Fundamental limits of caching,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 60, no. 5, pp. 2856–2867, May 2014.
[28] A. Sengupta, R. Tandon, and T. C. Clancy, “Fundamental limits of
caching with secure delivery,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics and Security,
vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 355–370, Feb. 2015.
[29] Z. H. Awan and A. Sezgin, “Fundamental limits of caching in D2D
networks with secure delivery,” in Proc. IEEE ICC Workshop on Wireless
Physical Layer Security, London, UK, Jun. 2015.
[30] M. Gerami, M. Xiao, S. Salimi, and M. Skoglund, “Secure partial repair
in wireless caching networks with broadcast channels,” in Proc. IEEE
Conf. CNS, Sep. 2015, pp. 353–360.
[31] F. Gabry, V. Bioglio, and I. Land, “On edge caching with secrecy
constraints,” in Proc. IEEE ICC, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, May 2016.
[32] A. Balasubramanian, H. D. Ly, S. Li, T. Liu, and S. L. Miller, “Secure
symmetrical multilevel diversity coding,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol.
59, no. 6, pp. 3572–3581, Jun. 2013.
[33] C. Li, X. Guang, C. W. Tan, and R. W. Yeung, “Fundamental limits on
a class of secure asymmetric multilevel diversity coding systems,” IEEE
J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 737–747, Apr. 2018.
[34] L. Xiang, D. W. K. Ng, R. Schober, and V. W. S. Wong, “Cache-enabled
physical layer security for video streaming in backhaul-limited cellular
networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 736–751,
Nov. 2017.
[35] L. Xiang, D. W. K. Ng, R. Schober, and V. W. S. Wong, “Secure video
streaming in heterogeneous small cell networks with untrusted cache
helpers,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 2645–2661,
Apr. 2018.
[36] T.-X. Zheng, H.-M. Wang, F. Liu, and M. H. Lee, “Outage constrained
secrecy throughput maximization for DF relay networks,” IEEE Trans.
Commun., vol. 63, no. 5, pp. 1741–1755, May 2015.
[37] L. Zheng and D. Tse, “Diversity and multiplexing: A fundamental
tradeoff in multiple-antenna channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol.
49, no. 5, pp. 1073–1096, May 2003.
[38] S. N. Chiu, D. Stoyan, W. Kendall, and J. Mecke, Stochastic Geometry
and its Applications, 3rd ed. John Wiley and Sons, 2013.
[39] I. S. Gradshteyn, I. M. Ryzhik, A. Jeffrey, D. Zwillinger, and S.
Technica, Table of Integrals, Series, and Products, 7th ed. New York:
Academic Press, 2007.
[40] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2004.
